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Recommender systems have relied on many intelligent technologies (e.g. machine learning) which have
procured credibility issues due to several concerns ranging from lack of privacy and accountability, biases and
their inherent design complexity. Given this lack of understanding of how recommender systems work, users
strategically interact with such systems via accepting any information with a grain of salt. Furthermore, the
recommender system evaluates choices based on a dierent utilitarian framework, which can be fundamentally
dierent from the user’s rationality. erefore, in this paper, we model such an interaction between the
recommender system and a human user as a Stackelberg signaling game, where both the agents are modeled
as expected-utility maximizers with non-identical prior beliefs about the choice rewards. We compute
the equilibrium strategies at both the system and the user, and investigate conditions under which (i) the
recommender system reveals manipulated information, and (ii) trust regarding the recommender system
deteriorates when the true rewards are realized at the user.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems have successfully enabled people and technology to interact in a seamless
manner, and improved the social, economic, and environmental well-being in a wide range of
domains such as transportation, disaster management, markets and e-health. ese systems have
become feasible due to many recent advancements in articial intelligence (AI) and machine
learning community and their application to various practical domains. However, many concerns
(e.g. fairness/privacy [12], lack of accountability [8], lack of interpretability [7]) have been looming
around the credibility of such intelligent technologies due to two reasons: (i) the presence of inherent
biases within the data collected from people, and (ii) our inability to comprehend the complexity in
human decisions. Given that most researchers have been actively developing solutions to mitigate
the rst concern, we focus our aention on the second concern, particularly in the context of
strategic persuasion in personalized recommender systems.
e biggest challenge in modeling human decisions is that people exhibit a wide range of
deviations (e.g. loss aversion, intransitive preferences, selective aention, and anchoring) from
prescriptive models such as expected utility maximization, which are sometimes hard to characterize
using a single mathematical framework. is results in a mismatched mental model within the
articial intelligence of personalized recommender systems, thus leading people to mistrust their
recommendations and/or interventions. Furthermore, the actions of a few selsh organizations
have recently tainted the notion of persuasion [14], since human decisions have been inuenced
in a manner that reinforces their selsh desires (e.g. Cambridge Analytica manipulated a specic
subset of voters to help swing election results). In spite of this turmoil, persuasion is not necessarily
evil, and has been pervasive in our society [2] for several centuries (e.g. refer to Aristotle’s Rhetoric
on the art of persuasion and its applications in education and politics [11]). In fact, persuasive
socio-technical interaction manifests whenever complex issues arise as in the case of several real-
world applications such as transportation, disaster management systems, markets and e-health,
which cannot be solved by mono-teams (where all the agents are of the same type).
Strategic information transmission has been actively pursued in the economics literature since
early 1980s. Some notable examples include strategic information transmission (SIT) games in [5],
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Bayesian persuasion in [13], information disclosure in [17], and informational nudges in [4]. In
the classical SIT framework in [5], the sender-receiver mismatch was modeled using non-identical
utilities where a single parameter inuences only the sender’s utility (e.g. private information),
and is independent of the receiver’s utility. Crawford and Sobel have studied Nash equilibria
within SIT framework, and found that the sender employs quantization rules to encode the signal
before sending it to the receiver. In contrast to Crawford and Sobel, information disclosure [17]
and persuasion [13] mechanisms have been proposed recently to analyze SIT framework in a
Stackelberg seing (with sender as the leader, and receiver as the follower). Recently, this topic has
also been studied actively by the information-theoretic community [1, 15, 18] as well as researchers
in computer science [3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 19].
In this paper, we develop a mathematical framework to model strategic interaction between the
personalized recommender system and a human decision maker (user) as a Stackelberg signaling
game, when both agents have non-identical (prior) belief distributions about the choice rewards.
We assume that the personalized recommender system acts as a leader and reveals a signal to the
human decision maker, who then makes a decision based on both the system’s shared belief and
his/her own prior belief. For the sake of tractability, we assume that the rationality of human
decision maker is based on expected utility maximization. In such a seing, our goal is to compute
the equilibrium strategies at both the recommender system and the user, and investigate conditions
under which (i) the recommender system reveals manipulated information, and (ii) user trust
regarding the recommender system deteriorates, aer the true rewards are realized.
Note that the strategic interaction investigated in this paper is fundamentally dierent to strategic
interactions studied in the past literature. While aspects of persuasion between a sender and receiver
are analyzed in [13], this work utilizes Bayesian updating as the method for constructing posterior
beliefs of a sender and receiver while our approach constructs the posterior belief of the sender
and receiver based on convex combination of prior and signalled beliefs. Further, [13] assumes a
symmetric information seing between a sender and receiver, while our approach assumes the
presence of information asymmetry since the sender’s prior belief is assumed as private information,
which forces the receiver to rely on the signal revealed by the sender. Such a framework unfolds
trust issues at the receiver, which has not been investigated in the past literature. Our ndings
regarding the evolution of trust between the sender and receiver can also be seen to coincide with
people’s behavior in the real world.
2 PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a human-AI interaction seing as shown in Figure 1, where a person (Bob) is presented
with a set of choices N = {1, · · · ,N } which is also known to AI (Alice). Although both Alice
and Bob are not aware of the true nature of the choice rewards, we assume that both the agents
can construct probabilistic beliefs regarding choice rewards based on their private information. If
x = {x1, ...,xN } ∈ X represents the state of the world, let p(x) and q(x) denote the prior beliefs
at Alice and Bob respectively dened on the probability simplex SX = ∆(X) on the reward space
X. In order to make this interaction sensible, we assume that Alice can have access to extrinsic
private information which is typically acquired through some sensing infrastructure (e.g. sensor
network, social sensing), in order to compute her posterior belief p(x). is introduces information
asymmetry in our problem seing, which motivates Bob to rely on Alice’s messages.
Assuming that Alice has perfect knowledge about Bob’s belief q(x), Alice constructs a new belief
signal pip (x) over the simplex SX based on Alice’s belief p(x) and shares it with Bob. en, Bob
combines his prior belief with the received information and constructs a posterior belief
ϕ(x) = αpip (x) + (1 − α)q(x), (1)
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Fig. 1. System Model and Interactions
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that captures Bob’s trust in Alice’s message. For example, if
α → 1, then Bob starts trusting Alice blindly via disregarding his own prior belief regarding choice
rewards. On the other extreme, if α → 0, then Bob starts distrusting Alice and makes decisions
that are totally based on his own prior belief.
Letψ = {ψ1, ...,ψN } ∈ SN denote the probabilistic decision rule employed by Bob, where SN
is the probability simplex on the choice set N , andψn is the probability of picking the nth choice
based on Bob’s ex-post belief pip (x). In such a case, Alice realizes an average reward
UA(pip ,ψ) =
N∑
n=1
ψn · Ep (Xn), (2)
where p(xn) denotes the nth marginal reward distribution in p and Ep (Xn) is the nth marginal
expectation of p(x).
On the other hand, Bob’s ex-post utility is given by
UB (pip ,ψ) =
N∑
n=1
ψn · Eϕ (Xn), (3)
where ϕ(xn) denotes the nth marginal reward distribution in ϕ(x), and Eϕ (Xn) is the nth marginal
expectation of ϕ(x).
In this project, we model the strategic interaction between Alice and Bob as a Stackelberg game
with Alice as the leader and Bob as the follower, as shown below:
ψ∗(pip ) , arg max
ψ
UB (pip ,ψ), and
pi ∗p , arg max
pip
UA(pip ,ψ∗(pip )),
(P1)
where SA and SB are the strategy spaces at Alice and Bob respectively.
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3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
3.1 Stage 1: Bob’s Best Response
Given Alice chooses a signaling strategy pip , Bob’s best response is to chooseψ = {ψ1, · · · ,ψN }
such that the expected utility at Bob
UB (pip ,ψ) =
N∑
n=1
ψnEϕ (Xn)
=
N∑
n=1
ψn
[
αEpip (Xn) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn)
] (4)
is maximized.
For the sake of easy notation, let us denote
yn = αEpip (Xn) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn), (5)
for all n ∈ N . en, the expected utility at Bob can be rewrien as
UB (pip ,ψ) =
N∑
n=1
ψnyn . (6)
In other words, the rst optimization problem in (P1) (which Bob is interested to solve) reduces to
minimize
ψ
−yTψ
subject to 1. 1Tψ = 1,
2. ψ ≥ 0,
(P2)
where y = {y1, · · · ,yN } is a vector of yn variables dened in Equation (5).
Theorem 1. For a given trust parameter α , signaling strategy pip (x) and prior q(x), Bob’s best
response (i.e. solution to Problem P2) is given by
ψ ∗n(pip ) =

1, if n = arg max
n∈N
yn ,
0, otherwise,
(7)
where yn = α Epip (Xn) + (1 − α) Eq(Xn).
Proof. e Lagrangian function for Problem (P2) is given by
L(ψ,λ,ν ) = −yTψ + ν (1Tψ − 1) − λTψ
= [−y + ν1 − λ]T ψ − ν
(8)
e dual function for Problem (P2) is given by
`(λ,ν ) = minimize
ψ ∈SN
L(ψ,λ,ν )
=
{−ν , if −y + ν1 − λ ≥ 0,
−∞, otherwise.
(9)
Note that, for all λ  0, the above dual function acts as a lower bound to the Lagrangian function
in Equation (8), which itself acts as a lower bound to the objective function −yTψ.
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erefore, the dual problem to Problem P2 is given as follows:
maximize
λ, ν
−ν
subject to 1. ν ≥ yn + λn , for all n ∈ N ,
2. λn ≥ 0, for all n ∈ N .
(P3)
Without any loss of generality, Constraint 1 in Problem (P3) can be equivalently replaced with
the statement
ν ≥ max
n∈N
(yn + λn) . (10)
Since the objective of Problem (P3) is equivalent to minimizing ν , the optimal choice of ν reduces to
ν∗ = max
n∈N
yn . (11)
Since the duality gap in a linear program is zero, the optimal value of the primal problem in (P2)
is also equal to ν∗, which can be obtained with Bob’s best response shown in Equation (7). 
3.2 Stage 2: Optimal Signaling at Alice
Alice’s optimal signal strategy is to choose the maximum entryψn in the vectorv = {v1, · · · ,vN }
such that
UA(pip ,ψ) =
N∑
n=1
ψn · Ep (Xn) (12)
is maximized. For the sake of easy notation, let us denote
zn = Ep (Xn) (13)
for all n ∈ N . en, the expected utility at Alice can be rewrien as
UA(pip ,ψ) = zTψ. (14)
If we denote z = {z1, · · · , zN } as a vector of zn variables dened in Equation (13), the second
optimization problem in (P1), which Alice wishes to solve, reduces to
maximize
pip ∈SX
zTψ∗(pip ) (P4)
Theorem 2. e optimal signaling strategy at Alice is to choose a distribution pip such that
αEpip (Xn∗ ) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn∗ ) ≥ αEpip (Xn) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn) (15)
holds true for all n ∈ N , where n∗ = arg max Epip (X ).
Proof. Note thatψ∗(pip ) depends on y as shown in Equation (7), which in turn depends only on
the expectation of pip (x), and not on the distribution itself. In other words, it is sucient for Alice
to share the average choice rewards to Bob, instead of sharing the distribution pip (x). erefore, we
henceforth assume that Alice only shares average rewards to Bob.
If we denote average rewards as µ = Epip (X ), then Problem P5 reduces to the following:
maximize
µ∈X
zTψ∗(µ) (P5)
Since Bob choosesψ∗(pip ) according to Equation (7), it is natural to identify n∗ = arg max z and
maximize yn∗ via choosing µ such that
αµn∗ + (1 − α)Eq(Xn∗ ) ≥ αµn + (1 − α)Eq(Xn), (16)
holds true for all n ∈ N .
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
Corollary 1 (to Theorem 2). Revealing the average rewards Epip (X ) as opposed to signaling the
distribution pip does not have any eect on the utilities at both Alice and Bob.
4 TRUST ANALYSIS
Before we analyze the eects of trust parameter α on Alice’s signaling, we rst dene strategic
manipulation formally in the following denition.
Definition 1. Alice employs strategic manipulation if she chooses Epip (X ) , Ep (X ).
In other words, if we replace Ep (Xn∗ ) in the Alice’s optimal signaling condition in Equation
(15), we can nd seings in which Alice employs strategic manipulation. We state this condition
formally in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. (to eorem 2) Alice adopts strategic manipulation if there exists at least one n ∈ N
such that the following condition holds true.
αEp (Xn∗ ) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn∗ ) < αEp (Xn) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn), (17)
where n∗ = arg max Epip (X ).
Note that, when α = 1, Condition (17) does not hold true, since n∗ = arg max Ep (X ). In other
words, when Bob trusts Alice, Alice naturally has the incentive to reveal truthful information to
Bob. We state this result formally in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. (to eorem 2) When α = 1, Alice has no incentive to share manipulated information
to Bob.
Although Alice may reveal truthful information to Bob, he cannot observe if Alice’s signaling
strategy is congruent with her prior belief p. is lack of information regarding Alice’s prior belief
p can lead to distrust at Bob regarding Alice, especially when Bob does not obtain the desired
outcomes. erefore, in this paper, we model Bob’s trust dynamics in the following manner:
α+ = α + ϵ · RB (α) (18)
where ϵ > 0 is the default step size, and RB = UB (pi ∗p , f ∗) −U ∗B is Bob’s regret for not obtaining the
utility U ∗B , which he would have obtained if he did not interact with Alice. In other words, U
∗
B can
be computed by substituting α = 0 in Equation (7).
Given Alice’s strategy pip , let
n? = arg max
n∈N
αEpip (X ) + (1 − α)Eq(X ) (19)
denote the choice picked by Bob aer interacting with Alice, as pointed in eorem 1. In such a
case, Bob’s regret can be computed as
RB = αEpip (Xn?) + (1 − α)Eq(Xn?) − Eq(Xn~ ), (20)
where n~ = arg max
n∈N
Eq(X ) is the choice that Bob would have picked if he did not interact with
Alice. Obviously, if Bob does not participate in this interaction, then α = 0 and his regret will
continue to remain zero. erefore, we henceforth ignore this trivial case, and always assume that
Bob interacts with Alice with α > 0.
As our nal result, we show that the dynamical model dened in Equations (18) and (20) can
potentially deteriorate Bob’s trust even though Alice is revealing information truthfully.
Doris E. M. Brown and Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla 7
Claim 1. Bob’s trust deteriorates even though Alice reveals truthful signals, whenever
α <
Eq(Xn~ ) − Eq(Xn?)
Ep (Xn?) − Eq(Xn?) . (21)
Proof. If Alice is truthful, then pip = p. erefore, we replace pip with p in the denition of RB ,
and obtain Bob’s regret under the condition when Alice reveals its prior information truthfully
regarding the choice rewards. Note that Bob’s trust deteriorates whenever RB < 0. Rearranging
the terms, we obtain the claimed result. 
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this project, we modeled the strategic interaction between a recommender system, Alice, and
a human agent, Bob, as a Stackelberg game with Alice as the leader and Bob as the follower.
We computed the equilibrium strategy at Bob, and presented sucient conditions for Alice’s
equilibrium strategy. By analyzing dynamics of Bob’s trust, we found that Alice will employ
strategic manipulation if her signalling strategy does not match her posterior belief, but Alice
has no incentive to employ strategic manipulation if Bob does not distrust her. We also showed
that Bob’s trust may deteriorate even when Alice is revealing information truthfully, if he does
not obtain a desired outcome aer interacting with Alice. In our future work, we will extend
these results by considering the evolution of Bob’s trust towards Alice when Bob’s rationality are
characterized by human decision models as opposed to expected utility maximization.
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